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This review investigates empirical evidence for different theoretical proposals
regarding the retreat from overgeneralization errors in three domains: word
learning (e.g., *doggie to refer to all animals), morphology [e.g., *spyer, *cooker
(one who spies/cooks), *unhate, *unsqueeze, *sitted; *drawed], and verb argument
structure [e.g., *Don’t giggle me (c.f. Don’t make me giggle); *Don’t say me that (c.f.
Don’t say that to me)]. The evidence reviewed provides support for three proposals.
First, in support of the pre-emption hypothesis, the acquisition of competing
forms that express the desired meaning (e.g., spy for *spyer, sat for *sitted, and
Don’t make me giggle for *Don’t giggle me) appears to block errors. Second, in
support of the entrenchment hypothesis, repeated occurrence of particular items
in particular constructions (e.g., giggle in the intransitive construction) appears
to contribute to an ever strengthening probabilistic inference that non-attested
uses (e.g., *Don’t giggle me) are ungrammatical for adult speakers. That is, both
the rated acceptability and production probability of particular errors decline
with increasing frequency of pre-empting and entrenching forms in the input.
Third, learners appear to acquire semantic and morphophonological constraints
on particular constructions, conceptualized as properties of slots in constructions
[e.g., the (VERB) slot in themorphological un-(VERB) construction or the transitive-
causative (SUBJECT) (VERB) (OBJECT) argument-structure construction]. Errors
occur as children acquire the fine-grained semantic and morphophonological
properties of particular items and construction slots, and so become increasingly
reluctant to use items in slots with which they are incompatible. Findings also
suggest some role for adult feedback and conventionality; the principle that, for
many given meanings, there is a conventional form that is used by all members of
the speech community. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Many different animal species have sys-tems of communication that are remarkably
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sophisticated. However, human languages are unique
in that they afford speakers the productivity to
express new meanings. In some cases, this produc-
tivity involves extending an existing word to take on a
new meaning (e.g., spam, Google). In others, a prefix
or suffix is productively applied to new items (e.g.,
un+subscribe; Bush+ism; Obama+ed). Perhaps, the
most impressive examples of productivity are seen
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when speakers combine words to produce entirely
novel sentences, such as this one (or Chomsky’s
famous example Colorless green ideas sleep furiously).
But this productivity comes at a cost. At all three levels,
the mechanisms that yield this capacity suggest gener-
alizations that would be considered unacceptable by
native adult speakers (i.e., overgeneralizations). For
example,
• at the lexical level, children overgeneralize words
to referents for which they would not be
appropriate for adults (e.g., *doggie to a bear, a
horse, and Cookie Monster).1
• at the morphological level, children overgeneral-
ize derivational suffixes [e.g., *spyer, *cooker
(one who spies/cooks)] and prefixes (e.g.,
*unhate, *unsqueeze), as well as inflectional mor-
phemes (e.g., *sitted; *drawed).1
• at the level of verb argument structure (syntax),
children overgeneralize verbs into syntactic
constructions with which they are incompatible
[e.g., *Don’t giggle me (c.f. Don’t make me
giggle); *Don’t say me that (c.f. Don’t say that
to me)].2
The purpose of this review is to summarize
and evaluate the empirical evidence for different
theoretical proposals about how children retreat
from these errors, or—indeed—how some children
apparently avoid some types of error altogether, while
retaining the capacity for productive generalization.
OVERGENERALIZATION AT THE
LEXICAL LEVEL
The earliest overgeneralization errors occur when
a child extends a particular word to other refer-
ents that share some visual or conceptual similarity.
One particularly extensive summary of early lexical
development1 presented a large number of such errors,
including doggie (to all animals), apple (both to other
round objects such as rubber balls and round lamps,
and to other fruits such as strawberries, pears, and
peaches), and moon (to a half grapefruit, a lemon
slice, a dial on a dishwasher, and a shiny leaf). The
same study concluded that such errors generally occur
only up until around age 2;6. Traditionally,3,4 these
errors have been viewed as either category errors (e.g.,
the child incorrectly assigns the concept of ‘ball’ to her
apple category) or pragmatic adaptions to vocabulary
limitations (e.g., the child knows that the ball is not
really an apple, but uses the word in her vocabulary
with the closest available meaning, in order to make
herself understood). However, the findings of a recent
priming study conducted with young 2-year-olds5 sug-
gest that at least some errors may be errors of lexical
retrieval. After correctly labeling a particular item
(e.g., cake), some children incorrectly overextended
this label to a perceptually similar item (e.g., a drum),
even though they demonstrated knowledge of the
correct label in a comprehension task. Nevertheless,
whether or not they constitute true overgeneraliza-
tion errors, some of the mechanisms that have been
proposed to explain how children quickly retreat
from these errors are also applicable to the more




A useful starting point is to ask exactly why it is
incorrect to use (for example) the word doggie to refer
to a bear, a horse, or Cookie Monster. One possible
answer illustrates the principles of conventionality and
contrast6:
For certain meanings, there is a conventional form
that speakers expect to be used in the language com-
munity; that is, if one does not use the conventional
form that might have been expected, it is because one
has some other contrasting meaning in mind (p. 319).
The principle of conventionality works against
overgeneralization errors (e.g., doggie for a bear), as
children are aware that, to be understood, they must
use the conventional form used by other speakers (i.e.,
bear). The principle of contrast will assist in the retreat
from overgeneralization in a similar way. If a child
expects to hear doggie (her own overgeneralized word
for bear) but hears bear, she can infer that bear is
not simply a synonym for doggie, but has a different
meaning.
Experimental evidence that children use the
principles of conventionality and contrast comes from
studies where children are shown two unfamiliar
objects and taught the name for one (e.g., mef ). When
asked by an experimenter to (for example) ‘Give me
the wug’, 3-year-old children overwhelmingly select
the previously unlabeled object (82% of trials in Ref
7). A follow-up study8 demonstrated that 4-year-
old children understand that common nouns (e.g.,
the melloo), but not person names (Melloo), are
conventional and known to all members of a speech
community.
Interestingly, the principles of conventionality
and contrast are not restricted to language. For
example, if 3-year-old children are taught to perform a
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novel action, they spontaneously assume a normative
convention with regard to the way that the action
is performed, and protest strongly if this norm is
violated.9 With regard to contrast, if children of this
age are shown two unfamiliar objects and given an
arbitrary fact about one (e.g., ‘This is from Mexico’),
when asked—for example—for ‘The one my dog likes
to play with’, they will select the other.7
OVERGENERALIZATION AT THE
MORPHOLOGICAL LEVEL
Another domain in which overgeneralization errors
have been observed is derivational morphology. For
example, the suffix -er can be added to many verb
stems to create a noun with the meaning of a
person or thing that performs the relevant action [e.g.,
swim(m)+er, run(n)+er, and comput(e)+er]. Through
application of this generalization, children have been
reported to produce innovative nouns such as *spyer,
*cooker, *applier, *whisker (for whisk), and *driller
(for drill)1 and—via backformation (i.e., application
of this rule in reverse)—innovative verbs such as *to
ham (hit with hammer), *to hoove (vacuum with
Hoover), and *to dag (stab with dagger).10 Similarly,
the prefix un- can be added to many verbs to denote
the reversal of an action (e.g., untie and unwrap), but
children often overgeneralize this rule to yield forms
such as *to unblow (deflate), *to unlight (extinguish,
of a fire), *to unpull (undo, of a belt), *to unappear
(disappear), and *to unsqueeze (release, let go).2,11
Pre-emption
One mechanism that seems to be particularly
important with regard to errors of this type is pre-
emption12:
If a potential innovative expression would be pre-
cisely synonymous with a well-established expression,
the innovation is normally pre-empted by the well-
established term, and is therefore considered ungram-
matical (p. 798).
Pre-emption is very similar to the pragmatic
principles of conventionality and contrast. If there is a
difference, it is perhaps that pre-emption applies more
to overgeneralizations that involve new coinages (e.g.,
*spyer and *to unblow) as opposed to the overex-
tension of existing terms (e.g., *doggie for bear).
The authors who first used the term in this context
distinguish three types of pre-emption (see Ref 12,
p. 81–82). Pre-emption by suppletion occurs when an
overgeneralized form is blocked by an existing form
with an unrelated root (e.g., deflate for *unblow).
Pre-emption by entrenchment occurs when an over-
generalized form is blocked by an existing form with
the same root (e.g., applicant for *applier and disap-
pear for *unappear). Pre-emption by ancestry occurs
when, for example, a verb (e.g., to drill and to whisk)
was created from a noun in the first place (drill
and whisk), with this original noun pre-empting a
new coinage with the same meaning (*driller and
*whisker). Although these distinctions are not par-
ticularly important for our purposes here—all are
cases of the overriding principle of contrast/pre-
emption—some of the subtypes are more important
than others for other types of overgeneralization
errors, discussed in subsequent sections.
Pre-emption is also sometimes known as
blocking,13 a term that highlights the roots of the
concept in the animal-learning literature. If an animal
has learned that an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food)
is fully predicted by one conditioned stimulus (e.g., a
bell), then it has great difficulty learning that a second
conditioned stimulus (e.g., a tone) also predicts the
unconditioned stimulus.14 A related concept from the
word-learning literature is mutual exclusivity15 (or
the novel name-nameless category principle) which
‘leads children to prefer only one label per object’,16
itself very similar to the principles of conventionality
and contrast (see above). A detailed discussion of the
differences and relationship between these proposals
is beyond the scope of this article (though see Ref
17, p. 78–80 for one such attempt). Here, we note
simply that the mechanisms lie on a continuum from
blocking (completely domain-general; indeed species-
general) through conventionality/contrast (general to
non-linguistic types of learning; e.g., fact-learning) and
pre-emption (specific to language, but encompassing
word learning, morphology, and syntax) to mutual
exclusivity/novel name-nameless category (specific to
word learning). This raises the possibility that the
more domain-specific proposals reflect the operation
of a more general learning mechanism, viewed through
the lens of a particular domain or debate (e.g., word
learning and syntax).
Semantic Constraints
Pre-emption is almost certainly the major mecha-
nism by which children retreat from errors where
the overgeneralized form has a perfectly synonymous
competitor (e.g., spy, drill, and disappear for *spyer,
*driller, and *unappear); this is probably also the case
for suppletive past-tense forms (e.g., went for *goed,
see the following section). However, some overgen-
eralization errors in this domain would not seem to
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have perfectly synonymous competitors. For example,
potential competitors for *unsqueeze such as loosen,
ease up, release, let go, and remove are not synony-
mous with the overgeneralized form, as they do not
specify the reversal of a squeezing action. Broadening
the scope of pre-emption to any form that expresses
some part of the desired meaning is problematic.
For example, many of the potential competitors for
*unsqueeze listed above would seem to pre-empt not
only this over-general form but also perfectly accept-
able forms such as untie, remove, and untighten. Thus,
at least in the domain of un- prefixation, pre-emption
is unlikely to be sufficient as a solution.
Another factor that is probably relevant here is
verb semantics. It has long been thought that verbs that
may be prefixed with un- form a probabilistic family-
resemblance category, sharing meaning components
such as covering, enclosing, surface-attachment, cir-
cular motion, hand-movements, and change of state,
though no single property appears to be either nec-
essary or sufficient for membership.18,19 Indeed, one
recent study20 found that adult ratings of the extent
to which individual verbs exhibited each of these
properties could predict the relative unacceptability
of overgeneralized un- forms (e.g., *unsqueeze, *unal-
low, and *unstand) as rated by both children (aged
5–6 and 9–10 years) and adults, using a continuous
scale. This effect held after controlling for verb fre-
quency, reversibility (as rated by another group of
adults), and pre-emption, operationalized as the sum
frequency of possible pre-empting forms (again sug-
gested by adult informants). Interestingly, only the
middle-age group (9–10 years) displayed an effect of
pre-emption, perhaps because the younger children5,6
had not yet acquired the relevant pre-empting forms,
while the adults displayed a tendency toward binary
performance (i.e., assigning a rating of ‘completely
unacceptable’ to all un- forms that they considered
not to exist, regardless of the availability or otherwise
of pre-empting alternatives). A potentially useful way
to conceptualize the semantic effects observed in this
study is in terms of the degree of compatibility between
the semantic properties of individual verbs and the
VERB slot in an un-(VERB) morphological construc-
tion. This allows these errors to be understood within
the same framework as other types of overgeneral-
ization error, discussed in subsequent sections. Under
the assumption that it takes learners some time to
acquire the semantic features of both (1) the VERB
slot and (2) individual verbs, this account predicts
that semantics-based errors will persist into relatively
late in development, a prediction that enjoys some sup-
port from naturalistic,2,21 elicited production,11 and
judgment20 studies. In conclusion, both some form of
pre-emption (or contrast) and semantic constraints are
probably necessary elements of a complete account of
how children retreat from overgeneralization errors
involving derivational morphology.
Inflectional Morphology
Probably, the most-studied overgeneralization errors
in language acquisition22 are those involving the
regular English past-tense marker –ed (e.g., *goed,
*throwed, *sleeped, and *sitted), termed over-
regularization errors. Again, some form of contrast,
pre-emption or blocking (the term used with a slightly
more specific meaning here than in the discussion
above) seems to play an important role. A number of
studies23–25 have demonstrated a negative correlation
across verbs between the rate of overgeneralization
error and the relative or absolute frequency of the
correct form (e.g., went, threw, slept, and sat).
Again, though, pre-emption cannot be the whole
story, as it cannot explain performance with novel
items, for which no pre-empting past-tense form can
be stored in memory. One possibility26–28 is that chil-
dren set up a rule for regular verbs (e.g., add –ed)
and simply memorize the exceptions as a fixed list of
stems to which a particular irregular rule applies (e.g.,
IF stem = [sleep, weep, creep] THEN eep → ept). A
problem for this account is its prediction that ‘mor-
pholexical rules for irregular verbs do not generalize to
novel items’ (Ref 28, p. 273), because each rule applies
only to the verbs annotated with that rule in mem-
ory. In fact, judgment and production studies29–32
demonstrate that when given novel items consistent
with particular irregular patterns (e.g., fleep), both
adults and children generalize them readily (e.g., here
producing—or rating as highly acceptable—flept).
Another possibility is that learners set up probabilis-
tic productive generalizations for irregular verbs, but
inflect at least some regularsa using a default rule
(add –ed), which steps in when no irregular form is
found in memory, the dual-route or words-and-rules
model.32–35 Under this account, novel irregular forms
(e.g., flept) are generated by phonological analogy
with stored irregulars (thus explaining the findings
outlined above), but novel regulars (e.g., froed) by ‘a
default suffix concatenation process capable of operat-
ing on any verb, regardless of its sound’ (Ref 32, p. 2).
Thus, this account predicts that, in judgment studies,
‘the goodness of the suffixed (i.e., regular) past-tense
forms does not decline as a function of distance from
known suffixed forms’ (Ref 32, p. 22). Although this
prediction was supported in these authors’ own study,
two subsequent studies with more tightly controlled
stimuli29,30 have found precisely the opposite. The
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acceptability of a novel regular form (e.g., froed) is
indeed increased by the availability of phonological
‘friends’ (e.g., show-showed).
These findings support a single-route mod-
el31,36,37 under which both ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’
past-tense forms (this account assumes that the
distinction is not psychologically meaningful) are
stored and used as the basis for analogical
generalization. Indeed, as suggested above for un-
prefixation errors, it may be possible to also explain
past-tense errors in terms of the probabilistic fit
between properties of individual verb(-stem)s and
those of competing morphological constructions [e.g.,
(VERB)+t as in missed, kissed; (VERB)+ed as in
needed, seeded; (VERB)+vowel change as in sang,
rang].38 The difference is that, in this case, these
properties are phonological rather than semantic in
nature. In fact, it may be necessary to incorporate
a role for semantic properties too. One judgment
study39 demonstrated that participants preferred a
novel irregular past-tense form (frank) when the stem
(frink) was similar in meaning to drink/drank and a
regular past-tense form (frinked) when it was similar in
meaning to blink/blinked. Although this manipulation
clearly suffers from demand characteristics (‘Does the
experimenter want me to treat frink as a distorted
version of drink, or of blink?’40), another part
of the study demonstrated a more convincing role
for semantics. When coining a new verb (e.g., to
stick, meaning to hit with a stick), speakers may
avoid assigning it an irregular past-tense form that
already exists with a different meaning (e.g., stuck),
and instead use a regular form (e.g., sticked). This
study showed that ratings of semantic extendedness
(e.g., how dissimilar are ‘hitting with a stick’ and
‘become immobile’) predicted the relative acceptability
of the different forms (sticked/stuck). Counter to the
predictions of a rival account,41 grammatical status of
the stem (denominal/deverbal) did not.
The advantage of this concept of competing mor-
phological constructions is that, in addition to yielding
the pattern of results outlined above, it potentially
allows all types of overgeneralization error—includ-
ing syntactic overgeneralization errors, as discussed
in the following section—to be understood within the
same framework. Note that the assumption of compe-
tition in memory between different forms that express
the speaker’s message is shared by proposals from
otherwise very different theoretical frameworks.42–44
For languages with richer inflectional morphol-
ogy, constraining generalization does not generally
entail retreating from the over-application of a sin-
gle ‘regular rule’ (e.g., add –ed). Rather, learners
must learn to predict the appropriate morphological
behavior of (primarily) nouns and verbs on the basis
of distributional/morphophonological and semantic
properties that operate and interact probabilistically.
Consider, for example, the phenomenon of geni-
tive case marking in Polish. Masculine nouns that
take the marker –a (as opposed to –u) often, but
not always, end in one of a handful of deriva-
tional suffixes (e.g., -acz, -ak, -ek, -arz, -nik, and
-ec) and often, but not always, refer to smaller,
concrete objects. Consequently, one study found
that even young teenagers were not yet demon-
strating adult-like performance.45 Similar findings
have been reported for other highly inflected lan-
guages, including Finnish,46 Spanish,47 Italian,48
Dutch,49 and Serbian.50 Another distributional/
morphophonological factor that seems to be impor-
tant is phonological diversity. A study of Polish
children’s productivity with genitive, accusative, and
dative case marking found that children were most
productive with morphemes that apply to a large,
phonologically diverse class.51 Such findings have
often been taken as evidence of a role for ‘type
frequency’,52 with classes or patterns that apply to
more items being more productive. In fact, this is
probably an oversimplification. First, a number of
computer modeling studies have demonstrated that
it is a high degree of phonological diversity, rather
than type frequency per se, that seems to yield
increased productivity.53–55 Second, an elicited imi-
tation study56 found that 2- and 3-year-old children’s
productivity is best predicted by a measure that takes
into account the relative frequency of occurrence of





A verb argument-structure overgeneralization error
occurs when a child uses a verb (e.g., the intransitive-
only verb disappear) in an argument-structure con-
struction in which it is considered ungrammatical by
adult speakers (e.g., the transitive-causative construc-
tion; e.g., *Do you want to see us disappear our
heads?2). The generalization that has been overex-
tended here is one that allows verbs that have
been attested only in the intransitive construction
to appear in the transitive-causative construction and
vice versa (e.g., The ball bounced/rolled/moved; The
man bounced/rolled/moved the ball). Although the
majority of research has been conducted in English,
transitive-causative overgeneralization errors of this
type have also been observed amongst learners of
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BOX 1
POSSIBLE AND ATTESTED VERB ARGUMENT-STRUCTURE OVERGENERALIZATION ERRORS
Attested errors (all from Ref 2) are shown in bold, with the age of the child (years;months) and a possible
grammatical formulation using the alternate construction.
Construction (a) Construction (b)
(Inchoative) Intransitive Transitive (Causative)
Alternating The ball rolled The man rolled the ball
(a) only The man laughed
Do you want to see our heads disappear?
I don’t want any more grapes; I’ll cough
I (didn’t) giggle(d)
Will I climb up there?
Did it bleed?
I always sweat [when I wear it]
[They’re nice enough that] I wish I had one
*The clown laughed the man
*Do you want to see us disappear our heads? (6;0)
*I don’t want any more grapes; they just cough me (2;8)
*Don’t giggle me (3;0)
*Will you climb me up there (3;2)
*Did she bleed it? (3;6)
*It always sweats me
*[They’re nice] enough to wish me that I had one (5;8)
Prepositional-object (PO) dative Double-object (DO dative)
Alternating The boy gave a present to the girl The boy gave the girl a present
(a) only The boy dragged the box to the girl
The boy suggested the trip to the girl
I said no to her
Shall I whisper something to you?
*The boy dragged the girl the box
*The boy suggested the girl the trip
*I said her no (3;1)
*Shall I whisper you something? (7;8)
Contents (figure) locative Container (ground) locative
Alternating The boy sprayed paint onto the statue The boy sprayed the statue with paint
(a) only The boy poured water into the cup
Mommy, I poured water onto you
I don’t want it because I spilled orange juice onto it
*The boy poured the cup with water
*Mommy, I poured you [M: You poured me?] Yeah, with
water (2;11)
*I don’t want it because I spilled it of orange juice (4;11)
(b) only *The boy filled water into the cup
*I’m gonna cover a screen over me (4;5)
*Can I fill some salt into the bear [-shaped salt
shaker]? (5;0)
The boy filled the cup with water
I’m going to cover myself with a screen
Can I fill the bear with salt?
Taiwan Southern Min,57 Inuktitut,58 and Quechua.59
Further (English) examples of these errors and of
analogous errors involving the dative and locative con-
structions are given in Box 1. Explaining how children
retreat from these errors has proved a very difficult
challenge for language acquisition researchers, given
that there is generally no single form that straightfor-
wardly pre-empts or blocks the error (as, for example,
went for *goed).
Adult Recasts
Although adults very rarely provide direct negative
evidence that a particular form is incorrect (e.g.,
‘Don’t say ‘‘cover a screen over me’’’), they often pro-
vide positive evidence of possible grammatical uses
(e.g., producing the correct form—’I covered myself
with a screen’). This positive evidence constitutes
a type of indirect negative evidence—evidence that
alternative formulations are not permitted (formal-
ized below as pre-emption/entrenchment). Particularly
helpful are adult recasts, which express the child’s
intended meaning using a grammatical form. The fol-
lowing example60 is typical (note that the child shows
some evidence of accepting the recast).
Abe (2;5.7): the plant didn’t cried.
Father: the plant cried?
Abe: no.
Father: oh. the plant didn’t cry
Abe: uh-huh. [Kuczaj, Abe 3:163]
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Although many studies60–72 have shown that
children selectively modify their utterances in response
to recasts in this way, it would seem unlikely that they
are sufficient to explain the retreat from error. The
evidence summarized below indicates that children
reject as ungrammatical certain uses of very low
frequency and even novel verbs (in the latter case,
based on their semantics), for which they cannot have
received recasts during childhood.
Pre-emption
One possible solution is to broaden the notion of pre-
emption outlined above with respect to errors at the
single-word level (e.g., deflate blocking *unblow). For
example, a pre-empting alternative to a transitive-
causative overgeneralization error such as *The
magician disappeared the rabbit would be The
magician made the rabbit disappear (a periphrastic
causative construction):
Once one linguistic form for expressing a meaning has
been learned, it pre-empts other forms that express
the same meaning, unless the language input offers
positive evidence for a second form (Ref 73, p. 360).
Preemption is a particular type of indirect negative
evidence that results from repeatedly hearing a
formulation, B, in a context where one might have
expected to hear a semantically and pragmatically
related alternative formulation, A. Given this type
of input, speakers implicitly recognize that B is the
appropriate formulation in such a context, and that A
is not appropriate (Ref 74, p. 60).
There is some debate in the literature regarding
exactly what counts as ‘a context where one might
have expected to hear a[n]. . .alternative formulation’
(e.g., see Ref 75, especially p. 134–135, Refs 76
and 77). Essentially, however, the prediction that
follows from this account is that the greater the
token frequency of a particular verb in a particular
construction in the input (e.g., disappear in the
periphrastic causative; X made Y disappear), the less
likely children will be to produce the corresponding
error, where the verb appears in a semantically related
construction in which it is, in fact, prohibited (e.g.,
*X disappeared Y).
Two elicited production studies78,79 have
provided support for this prediction for children
aged 4–5 and above. Children were taught a novel
verb presented in intransitive sentences (e.g., The car
is tamming). A pre-emption group also heard this
verb used in periphrastic causative sentences (e.g.,
The mouse is making the car tam). As predicted,
this group was more reluctant than a control group
to generalize this verb into the transitive-causative
construction (e.g., *The mouse is tamming the car).
However, the use of a production task is not ideal
here, as it is impossible to rule out the possibility that
children in the pre-emption group produced fewer
overgeneralizations than the control group simply
because they produced more periphrastic causative
sentences (children generally produced only one
response per trial). That is, the ‘pre-emption’ training
may have simply increased the rate of production of
periphrastic causatives, but had no bearing on the
perceived acceptability of transitive causatives.
Two recent studies addressed this problem by
using a grammaticality judgment methodology with
children (aged 5–6 and 9–10 years) and adults, across
a large number of verbs (N = 301 and N = 142). A
regression methodology was used to allow for inves-
tigation of the unique contribution of pre-emption
above and beyond other predictors. Findings were
mixed with the pre-emption measure explaining a
unique proportion of variance for overgeneralization
errors involving the dative constructions,80 but not
the locative constructions.81 Further research—for
example on the transitive-causative construction—is
needed to clarify whether the effect of pre-emption
genuinely differs across constructions, or whether this
pattern is due to methodological differences between
the two studies (e.g., the different numbers of verbs
used). In addition to the un- prefixation judgment
study discussed above,20 a further production study74
found evidence for pre-emption in the domain of a-
adjectives (e.g., *the asleep boy is pre-empted by the
boy who is asleep). This study avoided the method-
ological problems associated with the transitive-
causative studies discussed above78,79 by testing gen-
eralization to novel items, though it was conducted
on adults, and has not yet been extended to children.
In summary, the balance of evidence suggests
that pre-emption plays an important role in the retreat
from overgeneralization. However, as for parental
feedback, pre-emption is unlikely to be sufficient, as
it cannot explain the finding outlined below that
adults and children rate certain uses of novel verbs
as ungrammatical (apparently on the basis of their
semantics), despite having heard no potentially pre-
empting uses.
Entrenchment
In common with pre-emption, the concept of entrench-
ment originates in the domain of morphological over-
generalizations, but has been extended—and slightly
altered—to encompass overgeneralizations of verb
argument structure. As it is generally understood in
Volume 4, January/February 2013 © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 53
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/cogsci
this domain, the claim of the entrenchment hypoth-
esis is that every attested token of a particular
verb—regardless of construction—contributes to an
ever strengthening probabilistic inference that unat-
tested uses are ungrammatical (‘otherwise I would
have heard it by now’) (note that, like pre-emption,
entrenchment is sensitive to token, as opposed to
type, frequency). The difference between pre-emption
and entrenchment can be illustrated by considering
the example overgeneralization error *The magi-
cian disappeared the rabbit. Pre-emption occurs only
when this verb appears in the single most-nearly-
synonymous construction: the periphrastic causative
(e.g., The magician made the rabbit disappear).
Entrenchment occurs when this verb appears in any
construction, or even as the sole element of an
utterance (e.g., He disappeared; Would you like me
to disappear?; Disappear!). Thus, in principle, pre-
emption (corpus frequency in a single construction)
and entrenchment (overall corpus frequency) can be
dissociated in experimental designs, though only a
handful of studies have attempted to do so.20,76,79–81
Entrenchment/pre-emption effects (again the two are
rarely dissociated) are often observed in Bayesian and
connectionist models of language acquisition.82–90
The prediction that follows from the entrench-
ment hypothesis is that, holding other factors con-
stant, overgeneralization errors with higher frequency
verbs (e.g., *The magician disappeared the rabbit) will
be both (1) less likely to be produced and (2) rated
as less acceptable than equivalent errors with lower
frequency verbs (e.g., *The magician vanished the
rabbit). There is a great deal of support for this pre-
diction from production and judgment studies, both
those using familiar English verbs20,76,80,81,91–97 and
those that have manipulated frequency experimentally
using novel verbs98 or—in one case—nouns in a novel
particle construction.99 These findings extend across
all the construction types studied (see Box 1) and,
indeed, novel constructions invented for the purposes
of the experiment.99,100
That said, very few of these studies have
attempted to dissociate entrenchment and pre-emption
and—to our knowledge—of those that have attempted
to do so,20,76,79–81 only three have done so by
statistically partialling out the effect of one on the
other. All three were conducted on children aged
5–6 and 9–10 years, and adults. Entrenchment was
found to have a dissociable effect beyond pre-emption
for errors involving un- prefixation (for the older
two groups) and the locative constructions (for
all three groups), but not the dative constructions
(for any group, though the raw entrenchment
measure was nevertheless a significant predictor of
participants’ judgments at all ages). One possibility
is that this is due to methodological differences
between the studies. Indeed, the fact that the pre-
emption and entrenchment measures are so highly
correlated makes it difficult to obtain reliable
estimates of the unique contribution of each. A more
interesting possibility is that the balance between
pre-emption and entrenchment differs according
to the particular generalization in question, and
may depend on the relative frequency of the verb
in potentially entrenching versus potentially pre-
empting constructions. For example, potentially pre-
empting verb uses are presumably relatively more
common for the dative constructions (where PO-
and DO-dative uses pre-empt one another) than
transitive-causative overgeneralizations (where pre-
emption occurs only via the rare periphrastic causative
construction). Indeed, as one leading proponent of
the pre-emption hypothesis has pointed out,74,75
entrenchment alone incorrectly predicts that frequent
verbs should be entirely unavailable for use in
unattested constructions, which does not seem to be
the case (e.g., ‘I actually had a moth go up my nose
once. I . . . coughed him out of my mouth’; p. 132).
More generally, many recent studies in other
domains of language acquisition have provided further
support for the role of probabilistic surface-based sta-
tistical/distributional learning—of which pre-emption
and entrenchment are specialized instances—in form-
ing and constraining generalizations. Perhaps, the
most celebrated example is an 8-month-old infants’
use of transitional probabilities between syllable pairs
to discover word boundaries.101 At the level of syntax,
a number of researchers have attempted to demon-
strate that probabilistic statistical learning can obviate
the need for innate constraints posited to solve appar-
ent learnability problems. While evaluation of this spe-
cific claim is well beyond the scope of this article, here
we present three examples of cases where statistical
learning seems to be at least part of the story, whether
or not additional innate constraints turn out to be
necessary. With regard to structure dependence,102
two computational modeling studies103,104 demon-
strated that a surface-based distributional learner can
predict the structure of complex questions (e.g., Is
the boy who is smoking crazy?) with a relatively high
degree of accuracy and, like children,105,106 generally
avoid structure-dependence errors (e.g., *Is the boy
who smoking is crazy?). With regard to subjacency,
a similar model107 was able to learn the structure
of well-formed questions (e.g., What did Sara hear
that everybody likes?), but not questions such as (e.g.,
*What did Sara hear the news that everybody likes?),
which, under traditional accounts,108,109 are ruled out
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by innate knowledge of subjacency, a grammatical
principle of which the model had no in-built knowl-
edge. Finally, one recent study110 demonstrated that
a Bayesian statistical learner could, in principle, learn
to choose the correct interpretation of anaphoric one.
The phenomenon is that when shown, for example,
‘a yellow bottle’ and asked to ‘find another one’,
children as young as 1;6 correctly interpret one as
referring to ‘yellow bottle’ (i.e., the phrasal category
N’) and not simply to ‘bottle’.111,112 Interestingly,
the model succeeds by doing something very close
to pre-emption/entrenchment: noting the absence of
the co-occurrence of strings (here, one) and referents
(here, bottles that are not yellow) that would be pre-
dicted by the over-general rule (here, that ‘one’ can
mean both yellow and non-yellow bottles). Although
the findings of a more recent study suggest that this
learner succeeds only because it incorporates innate
knowledge in the form of a filter on the evidence
that it considers,113 even researchers who advocate
the nativist position agree that statistical learning also
plays an important role (e.g., see Ref 111, p. B72).
In short, a fair conclusion is probably that
both surface-based statistical learning more generally
and pre-emption/entrenchment in particular play a
role in the formation and restriction of linguistic
generalizations. However, it is almost certainly the
case that such learning mechanisms are not sufficient
to explain the phenomenon. This is because these
mechanisms generally fail to include a role for
semantics (and, as a consequence, struggle to explain
why participants consider certain uses of novel
verbs to be unacceptable). However, as the evidence
reviewed below suggests, semantics seems to play a
crucial role in the retreat from overgeneralization.
Verb Semantics
The semantic verb class hypothesis114 starts from the
observation that verbs’ argument-structure privileges
are not arbitrary. Rather, verbs that may and may not
appear in particular constructions cluster into groups
of verbs with similar semantic properties. The relevant
semantic properties are, themselves, non-arbitrary,
having to do with the semantics of the construction.
For example, the transitive-causative construction
is associated with the meaning of direct, external,
prototypically physical causation (e.g., John broke the
window). Evidence for this claim is the observation
that the use of this construction to describe rather
indirect acts of causation (e.g., an event where John
distracts a passerby, causing him to walk into the
window and accidentally smash it) is somewhat
infelicitous. Consequently, verbs that exhibit these
semantic properties (e.g., verbs of ‘change of state’
such as open, close, and break) form classes that may
appear in the transitive-causative construction. On the
other hand, verbs that denote ‘volitional or internally
caused actions’ (Ref 114, p. 131) such as ‘coming into
or going out of existence’ (e.g., disappear, vanish) and
‘semi-voluntary emotional expression’ (e.g., laugh,
giggle) form classes that may not.
Under the semantic verb class hypothesis,114
children produce errors such as *I disappeared it or
*Don’t giggle me when they have acquired the general
semantics of the construction (or ‘broad-range rule’),
but have yet to hone the fine-grained narrow-range
semantic classes of verbs that may and may not appear
in that construction. The prediction that follows
from this hypothesis is that if children are tested
at this second stage, they should reject transitive-
causative uses of novel verbs that are semantically
consistent with intransitive-only classes (e.g., novel
verbs meaning to laugh or disappear in a particular
manner). This prediction was confirmed for 5- to
6-year-olds, 9- to 10-year-olds, and adults in two
recent studies.95,96 A follow-up study93 demonstrated
(1) that this effect is observed even when no familiar
English verbs (which could provide clues to correct
usage) are included in the study and (2) that children
also accept transitive-causative uses of novel verbs
from alternating classes (e.g., similar in meaning
to bounce/roll or break/smash), indicating that they
are not simply rejecting transitive-causative sentences
across the board. Both of these findings were also
observed for children aged 4;5 and above (though
not a younger group aged 2;5) in an analogous
elicited production study.78 Two further judgment
studies extended these findings to overgeneralization
errors involving the (1) locative115 and (2) dative94
constructions, although only for (1) the two older
groups (9–10 and adults) and (2) adults, respectively.
A finding common to all of these studies is
that participants are more tolerant of overgeneral-
izations involving some non-alternating verb classes
than others. For example, all age groups rated over-
generalizations of verbs of ‘semi-voluntary emotional
expression’—both familiar and novel—(e.g., *The
funny clown laughed/giggled/meeked Lisa) as more
unacceptable than overgeneralizations of verbs of
‘going out of existence’ (e.g., *The magician dis-
appeared/vanished/tammed Lisa). We have argued
elsewhere81,95,96 that this finding is problematic for
an account under which verbs are assigned to discrete
intransitive-only or alternating classes.
A possible solution is to replace the notion
of discrete semantic classes with something more
probabilistic. One possibility is that, as suggested
above with regard to un- prefixation, learners are
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acquiring constructions whose slots probabilistically
exhibit particular semantic properties. For example,
the (VERB) slot in the transitive-causative construc-
tion [(SUBJ) (VERB) (OBJ)] exhibits properties asso-
ciated with direct, external, prototypically physical
causation. If this is the case, then if it is possible to
obtain ratings of the extent to which verbs exhibit
the semantic properties relevant to the (VERB) slot
of particular constructions, these ratings should pre-
dict the acceptability of the sentence that results when
each verb is used in that construction. This prediction
has not yet been tested with regard to the transitive-
causative construction (though see Ref 95 for some
preliminary support). It does, however, enjoy support
from studies of the dative and locative constructions,






X causes Y to go to Z
(literally or
metaphorically)
X causes Z to possess Y
(literally or
metaphorically)
e.g., John sent a package to
Chicago (c.f., *John sent
Chicago the package)
e.g., The noise gave Sue a
headache (c.f., *The
noise gave a headache to
Sue)
Figure (content) locative Ground (container)
locative
X causes Y to move
into/onto Z
X causes Z to undergo a
state change as a result
of Y moving into/onto it
e.g., John poured water into
the cup (c.f., *John
poured the cup with
water)
e.g., John filled the cup with
water (c.f., *John filled
water into the cup)
Accordingly, in both studies, ratings of the extent
to which verbs were rated as exhibiting these semantic
properties were a significant predictor of the relative
(un)grammaticality of particular verb uses. This
finding held for all three age groups studied (5–6 years,
9–10 years, and adults), even after controlling for
effects of pre-emption and entrenchment. By virtue of
its probabilistic nature, such an account draws no line
in the sand between ‘true overgeneralizations’ and
more acceptable ‘coercions’ that are attested in the
adult language (e.g., ‘Did you loot me something?’, an
example provided by a reviewer who raised this issue).
This is in fact a desirable feature, as participants’
acceptability judgments in the studies discussed are
finely graded in exactly this way.
We should acknowledge that, as pointed out
by a (different) reviewer, our focus on verbs as
slot fillers represents a significant departure from
the more traditional (and perhaps prevailing) view
within linguistics that syntax is projected from
verbs in accordance with their valency requirements.
However, we would suggest both (1) that it is
difficulty to see how a valency-based approach could
explain the results outlined above and (2) that there
are sound theoretical arguments against such an
approach (e.g., it requires positing a three-argument
lexical entry for sneeze in order to account for the
acceptability of He sneezed the napkin off the table;
Ref 116).
Slots with Complex Properties
For the majority of cases discussed so far, the
relevant properties of particular (VERB) slots have
been either wholly semantic or wholly phonological
in nature. In some cases, however, the compatibility
of a particular item with a particular slot
reflects a complex combination of factors, hence
necessitating probabilistic acquisition mechanisms
that can incorporate roles for competing factors.
Indeed, with regard to the (VERB) slot in the
dative construction, these factors reflect both the
learner’s previous experience with the construction
and—indirectly—the history of the language itself.
As discussed above, the (VERB) slot in the two
dative constructions—PO and DO—exhibits subtly
different semantic properties (roughly, caused motion
versus caused possession). They also differ with
regard to properties that have been described as
morphophonological in nature.117,118 It has long been
noted that, even when semantically compatible, verbs
that are of Latinate origin are restricted to the PO-
dative construction, with DO-datives ungrammatical
(e.g., John suggested the trip to Sue; *John suggested
Sue the trip). The claim is not that speakers are
sensitive to etymology per se. Latinate verbs can
be identified by their stress pattern [disyllabic with
second-syllable stress (e.g., suggest) or trisyllabic
(contribute)] and perhaps by their use of certain
morphemes (e.g., -ify, -ate), whereas native Germanic
verbs are mostly monosyllabic (e.g., give, tell) or have
first-syllable stress. Within the present framework, this
can be captured by positing that the (VERB) slot in the
DO-dative probabilistically exhibits these properties
(i.e., monosyllabicity, first-syllable stress), such that
a less than fully grammatical utterance results when
a verb that does not exhibit these properties is used
in the slot (e.g., *John suggested Sue the trip; *John
donated the library the book). Although there has been
some scepticism in the literature with regard to this
proposed morphophonological constraint,119 three
studies have shown that adults (but not yet children)
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respect this constraint in judgment and production
studies, even when taught novel pseudo-Latinate
verbs.80,94,120 Relatedly, the findings of one recent
study suggest that the adjective slot in the adjectival
construction (ADJECTIVE) (NP) exhibits properties
that could be described as morphophonological
(or perhaps etymological) and rejects incompatible
adjectives. The restriction is that the filler of the
adjective slot must not be segmentable into a- plus
a related stem (e.g., the scared/astute/*alive/*afraid
man) and, again, adult learners respect this restriction
even with novel adjectives74 (though pre-emption also
seems to be at work here).
The information that is conveyed by verb
argument structure (word order) in the English
examples above (i.e., who did what to whom)
is instead, in many languages, conveyed by rich
systems of inflectional morphology (e.g., case marking
on nouns and person/number marking on verbs).
Nevertheless, the general mechanisms outlined in
this review would seem to be applicable to
languages and linguistic systems that are—on the
surface—very different to the case of English verb
argument structure: Again, probabilistic statistical
learning operating over interacting distributional,
morphophonological, and semantic properties can
explain how learners constrain their generalizations.
One well-studied example of such a system is gender
marking in languages such as Russian, Serbian,
and Lithuanian. In all three languages, 2- to 3-
year-old children produce incorrect gender marking
errors at rates of 20–30% in less transparent parts
of the system (e.g., for novel feminine nouns in
Russian121 and Serbian122 and novel masculine nouns
in Lithuanian123). To learn the system, children
must observe probabilistic partial regularities at
the level of distribution (e.g., nouns often appear
after agreeing adjectives), morphophonology (e.g.,
feminine nouns generally end in –a, as opposed to
a consonant), and semantics [e.g., masculine nouns
usually refer to males and feminine nouns to females,
though words that refer to males (e.g., uncle) are
sometimes declined as feminine and vice versa]. As
all are partial regularities, as opposed to hard and
fast rules, some kind of probabilistic generalization
mechanism working at the levels of distribution,
morphophonology, and semantics simultaneously is
really the only conceivable solution. Indeed, we would
suggest that if the investigation of the formation
and restriction of generalizations had begun with
such systems instead of—for example—the English
past-tense, single-mechanism accounts such as the
dual-route model would never have got off the
ground.
CONCLUSION
This review has summarized theoretical proposals
and empirical evidence regarding the retreat from
overgeneralization with regard to (1) word learning
[e.g., *doggie (for bear)], (2) morphology [e.g., *spyer
(for spy), *unsqueeze, *goed], and (3) verb argument
structure (e.g., *Don’t giggle me). Across the domains,
four factors seem to be particularly important.
• Conventionality: Children understand from an
early age that a speech community shares
conventions regarding the ‘right’ way to
express particular meanings, and are motivated
to acquire and respect these conventions.
Conventionality is not so much a mechanism
for the retreat from error in the sense that
contrast/pre-emption, entrenchment, and fit are,
more a necessary pre-condition that motivates
children to respect adult conventions in the first
place.
• Contrast/Pre-emption: Different forms—some
attested, some potential generalizations—com-
pete for the right to express the speaker’s
intended message. This is seen in all three
domains. For example, (1) bear pre-empts dog-
gie, the child’s over-general form for this ref-
erent, (2) went pre-empts *goed, and (3) the
periphrastic causative (e.g., The magician made
the rabbit disappear) pre-empts transitive-
causative overgeneralizations (e.g., *The magi-
cian disappeared the rabbit).
• Entrenchment: Even occurrences of items that
do not contribute to pre-emption (e.g., disap-
pear in constructions other than the periphrastic
causative) contribute to a probabilistic infer-
ence from absence. The more often a verb is
encountered without ever appearing in a partic-
ular construction, the stronger the inference that
its use in this construction is ungrammatical.
Although much work remains to be done in this
regard, when pre-emption and entrenchment are
dissociated experimentally, both generally make
some contribution, though the relative impor-
tance of each varies from study to study and
construction to construction.
• Fit: A potential generalization is grammatical to
the extent that the properties of the potential slot
filler (most often a verb) overlap with those of the
slot. This is true for morphological constructions
[un-(VERB); (VERB)-ed] and verb argument-
structure constructions such as the transitive
causative [(SUBJ) (VERB) (OBJ)]. The relevant
properties may be morphophonological (as for
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the past-tense constructions), semantic (as for the
transitive-causative and locative constructions),
or some combination thereof (as for the English
DO-dative construction and Slavic/Baltic gender
systems).
There are two further potentially relevant factors
that have received rather less attention. The first is the
overall frequency of each competing construction.76
It would seem likely that, all other factors being
equal, frequent constructions such as the transitive
causative will enjoy an advantage over less frequent
constructions such as the periphrastic causative in the
process by which constructions compete to express the
speaker’s intended message. The second is the extent
to which each construction is relevant to the speaker’s
communicative goals. For example, The rabbit disap-
peared is a perfectly grammatical description of an
event where a magician causes a rabbit to disappear,
but may lose out in the construction-competition pro-
cess to *The magician disappeared the rabbit because
this better expresses the speaker’s intended meaning.
Theoretical work on integrating all of these fac-
tors into a complete cross-domain account of the
retreat from overgeneralization has barely begun (for
some preliminary attempts, see Refs 17, 20, 80, 81,
and 94). Because such an account will necessarily
incorporate a number of interacting factors, it will
probably be best instantiated and tested as a compu-
tational model (for some attempts along these lines,
see Refs 86, 90, and 124–128b).
In the meantime, the empirical evidence summa-
rized in this review suggests that a complete account
of the retreat from overgeneralization errors in the
domains of word learning, morphology, and syntax
will include roles for at least the factors of con-
ventionality, contrast/pre-emption, entrenchment, and
semantic/phonological fit. It is to be hoped that future
research will elucidate the relative contributions of
these factors, and so bring us closer to a complete
understanding of the capacity for restricted general-
ization that is characteristic of human languages.
NOTES
aSuch accounts do allow for rote storage of some
regulars.
bA reviewer asked whether mechanisms such as pre-
emption, entrenchment, and verb semantics might
combine to yield U-shaped learning of verb argument
structure, as observed in the domain of past-tense
learning. Again, answering this type of question will
almost certainly require a computational model of
the relevant phenomenon. However, it is important
to note that macro U-shaped learning—where overall
error rates are low, then increase, then fall again—is
probably a myth.129 Although some verbs may show
an apparent error-free early period, a more com-
mon scenario is that correct forms and errors coexist,
with the former gradually winning out over the
latter.42
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FURTHER READING
Many of the articles cited in the review section can be downloaded from the first author’s website at http://pcwww.liv.ac.
uk/∼ambridge/ which also hosts example stimuli from a number of the studies reviewed.
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